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For the first time since 1909 Congress has enacted a com-
prehensive revision of copyright law. Signed by President Ford
on October 19, 1976, the new Copyright Act for most purposes
will become effective on January 1, 1978.1 One of the most sig-
1 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C.A.
§§ 101-810 (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976)) (transitional and supplementary provisions of
the Act are contained in 17 U.S.C.A. note prec. § 101 (1976)).
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nificant and most complex departures from prior law contained
in the new Act relates to the termination of transfers.
The termination provisions were designed to guarantee that
authors shall retain a reversionary interest in their works. The
purpose itself is not new, but the manner of its implementation
differs markedly from the patterns of the past. The 1909 Act
and its predecessors had provided for two consecutive terms of
copyright.3 In order for a work to continue to be protected
beyond its first term it was necessary that the copyright be "re-
newed." It was thought that at the time for renewal rights previ-
ously granted to others by the author would revert to the author.
The House Committee that reported out the 1909 Act ex-
plained:
It not infrequently happens that the author sells his
copyright outright to a publisher for a comparatively
small sum. If the work proves to be a great success and
lives beyond the [first] term of twenty-eight years, your
committee felt that it should be the exclusive right of
the author to take the renewal term, and the law should
be framed as is the existing law, so that he could not be
deprived of that right.
4
The renewal provisions were thus intended to benefit au-
thors by enabling them or their families to have a second oppor-
tunity to market their works after an original sale of copyright.
But why should authors be singled out for this paternalistic
treatment when other property owners are presumed to be
sophisticated sellers and are denied a second chance? Is it (as the
Supreme Court rhetorically inquired) that "authors are congeni-
tally irresponsible, [and] that frequently they are so sorely
2 Even the effective date of these provisions is uncertain. Text accompanying notes
174-81 infra (Section VA).
3 Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1970). The pattern of two consecutive
terms rather than a single term of copyright was first instituted in the Statute of Anne,
1709, 8 Anne, c. 19, and was contained in every American copyright law from 1790
through 1909.
4 H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1909). See also Harris v. Coca Cola,
Co., 73 F.2d 370, 371 (5th Cir. 1934) ("The second period is intended, not as an inci-
dent of the first for the benefit of the then owner of the expiring copyright, but as a
second recognition extended by the law to the author of work that has proven perma-
nently meritorious .... "), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 709 (1935); White-Smith Music Publish-
ing Co. v. Goff, 187 F. 247, 251 (1st Cir. 1911) ("There are at least sentimental reasons
for believing that Congress may have intended that the author, who according to tradi-
tion receives but little for his work, and afterwards sees large profits made out of it by
publishers, should later in life be brought into this kingdom.").
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pressed for funds that they are willing to sell their work for a
mere pittance"?5 Regardless of the merit of the foregoing prop-
osition, it ignores the most compelling justification for a rever-
sionary right: an author's property, unlike other forms of prop-
erty, is by its very nature incapable of accurate monetary evalua-
tion prior to its exploitation.6
Whether a popular song, a novel, or a play will strike the
public fancy and prove to be a continuing best seller or will meet
the more common fate of swift oblivion poses a problem that
authors and publishers both admit is pure guess work. An au-
thor (at least one without a reputation of past success) will neces-
sarily be in a poor bargaining position when initially negotiating
the sale of copyright.7 A second chance may well be warranted
for an author at a time when the economic worth of his or her
work has been proven. This reasoning is somewhat less persua-
sive when the original sale is on a percentage royalty basis so that
the author automatically shares in whatever returns his or her
work may bring. Even in such a case, however, the nature of the
royalty formula (e.g., whether based on gross receipts or "net
profits" defined in such a manner as to leave virtually nothing
after deduction of "costs") and the numerical amount of the
percentage may well vary depending upon the author's bargain-
ing position.
These circumstances amply justify a second chance for au-
thors even when comparable protection is not offered to other
forms of property. Congress recognized this premise when it
enacted the Copyright Act of 1976. The House Committee Report,
the most important piece of legislative history concerning the
new Act, refers to the necessity of "safeguarding authors against
unremunerative transfers . . . needed because of the unequal
bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from the im-
possibility of determining a work's value until it has been
exploited."
'8
Although the new Act retains the renewal structure for
works in statutory copyright as of January 1, 1978, it discards the
5 Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 656 (1943).
6 See Bartok v. Boosey & Hawkes, Inc., 523 F.2d 941, 944-45 (2d Cir. 1975) (citing
2 M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT § 113, at 462 (1963) [hereinafter cited as TREATISE]).
This rationale was suggested in B. RINGER, RENEWAL OF COPYRIGHT, COPYRIGHT
OFFICE STUDY No. 31, at 125 (1960).
s H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1976) thereinafter cited as H.
REP.].
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renewal structure for works created after such date as well as for
works protected only by common law (or state law) copyright
until the effective date of the new Act. The renewal structure is
procedurally clumsy and difficult.9 Because reversion under the
renewal system is tied to the term of copyright, some works may
be injected into the public domain by an inadvertent failure to
renew. Finally, the objective of a second chance for authors was
largely frustrated by the Supreme Court decision in Fred Fisher
Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons,1 recognizing the validity of
assignments of renewal rights prior to their vesting."
The termination provisions of the new Act constitute an
attempt to avoid the difficulties encountered under the renewal
concept, while at the same time achieving a reversion of rights. A
single term of copyright exists for works created after the effec-
tive date of the new Act,' 2 which prevents unintended injection
of works into the public domain by failure to renew. Reversion
occurs through the termination of transfers and licenses, and is
initiated by termination notices, rather than through the termi-
nation of an original copyright term and the creation of a second
term. The Witmark problem is avoided by the invalidation of
agreements for postreversion grants until the reversion has
occurred. 13 Whether procedural simplicity has been attained is
more debatable.'
4
I. SUBJECT MATTER OF STATUTORY TERMINATION
A. To What Types of Grants
Do the Termination Provisions Apply?
In general, the termination provisions apply to any "trans-
fer" of copyright 5 and to nonexclusive licenses of copyright or
of any right comprised in a copyright.' 6 A "transfer" includes
'See generally 2 TREATISE, supra note 6, at § 116.
10318 U.S. 643 (1943).
"See generally 2 TREATISE, supra note 6, at § 117.21.
12 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 302, 303 (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
13 See text accompanying notes 197-208 infra (Section VI).
14 The length of this Article attests to a rather negative conclusion on this point.
Is 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(a), 304(c) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
16 Id. "Non-exclusive grants were included in the right [of termination] on the
strength of the argument that, otherwise, there would be nothing to prevent a trans-
feree from avoiding the effect of the provision by compelling the author to grant him a
perpetual non-exclusive license along with a statutorily limited transfer of exclusive
rights." SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL
19771
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not only assignments (as understood under the old Act), but also
exclusive licenses and any other conveyance of copyright or of
any exclusive right comprised in a copyright. 17 A mortgage
("hypothecation") is included under the statutory definition of a
"transfer of copyright ownership"' 8 and hence is subject to ter-
mination.
Certain grants are excluded, however, from statutory ter-
mination. 19 We turn now to these exclusions.
1. Certain Grants of Common Law Copyright
Because common law copyright2 will be preempted on
January 1, 1978,21 any grant executed after that date necessarily
will be of statutory copyright, 22 and therefore will be subject to
termination.2 3 But grants of common law copyright may be exe-
cuted prior to January 1, 1978. The only pre-January 1, 1978
grants that are subject to termination are grants "of the renewal
copyright or of any right under it.''24 It might be argued that a
grant of common law copyright is not terminable because it is
not a grant of "renewal [statutory] copyright." A grant of com-
mon law copyright, however, could include a grant of the right
REVISIOx OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 1965 REVISION BILL, 89TH CONG., lST SESS. 73
(Comm. Print 1965) (Part 6) [hereinafter cited as REGISTER REPORT].
17 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976):
A "transfer of copyright ownership" is an assignment, mortgage, exclusive
license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or
of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is
limited in time or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.
IsId.
19 The reference here is only to termination that occurs by operation of law under
the Copyright Act. The parties to any grant may additionally include in its terms provi-
sions for termination under any conditions therein prescribed, and nothing in the Act
inhibits such provisions. Id. §§ 203(b)(6), 304(c)(6)(F); see H. REP., supra note 8, at 128,
142.
2" On the nature of common law copyright, see 1 TREATISE, supra note 6, at § 11.
21 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 301 (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
22 Works not yet reduced to a tangible medium of expression remain the subject of
common law copyright. See id. A grant executed before the work has been reduced to
tangible form will nevertheless be regarded as a grant of statutory copyright once the
work has achieved a tangible form. This is analogous to a grant of common law
copyright under the 1909 Act that becomes subject to the renewal provisions if subse-
quent to such grant the work qualifies for statutory copyright. See, e.g., Epoch Produc-
ing Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 522 F.2d 737, 747 n.8 (2d Cir. 1975) (dictum) (citing 2
TREATISE, supra note 6, § 114.3, at 469), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976). But if a work
is never reduced to tangible form, or otherwise is ineligible for statutory copyright, such
a grant of common law copyright will not be subject to the termination provisions.
23 17 U.S.C.A. § 203(a) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
- Id. § 304(c). The time when termination becomes effective differs markedly be-
tween grants executed prior to and those executed after January 1, 1978. Note 46 infra
& accompanying text.
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to obtain an original term statutory copyright, and also a grant
(if the author survives to the renewal period) of the right to the
renewal copyright. 25 If, therefore, the grant of common law
copyright sufficiently articulates an intent to assign or license
renewal rights, 26 and if statutory copyright is obtained on the
work before January 1, 1978,27 it will be subject to the termina-
tion provisions described below. Of course, if the grant of com-
mon law copyright does not by its terms convey any renewal
rights, a reversion will occur under the renewal provisions them-
selves, because the author (or other grantor) will be entitled to
the renewal rights.
Nevertheless, a grant of common law copyright (by
hypothesis made before January 1, 1978) that purports to in-
clude a grant of renewal rights when and if such rights vest will
not be subject to termination if the work in which this interest is
granted remains in common law copyright until January 1, 1978,
when it will become subject to statutory copyright by reason of
federal preemption. Such a grant will not be subject to termina-
tion under section 203(a), because it was not executed "on or
after January 1, 1978." It will not be subject to termination
under section 304(c) because, as previously noted, such termina-
tions pertain only to grants "of the renewal copyright or of any
right under it." In the case of a work protected by common law
copyright until the effective date of the new Act, there is no
renewal copyright even after the work has acquired statutory
copyright; these works instead fall within the new unitary term
of life of the author plus fifty years, subject to a certain
minimum period of protection. 8 Therefore, the termination
provisions of section 304(c), which relate only to grants "of the
renewal copyright," are inapplicable.
This conclusion is further confirmed by the fact that section
304(c) provides for termination of grants only of works in which
there was a "copyright subsisting in either its first or renewal
term on January 1, 1978."29 Thus, the termination provisions of
25 Regarding the assignability of renewal rights at the time of the initial grant, see
Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943).
26 See 2 TREATISE, supra note 6, at § 117.1.
27 Renewal of copyright is necessary if statutory copyright is obtained before
January 1, 1978, but not if it is obtained thereafter. 17 U.S.C.A. § 304 (West Supp. IV
part 1, 1976).
28 Id. § 303.
29 The term "copyright" here refers to statutory not common law copyright. See id.
§ 303; H. REP., supra note 8, at 138.
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section 304(c) apply only if the work in question was the subject
of statutory copyright prior to the effective date of the current
Act.
30
2. Works Made for Hire
The new Act expressly provides that a grant from author to
employer of rights in a "work made for hire" is not subject to the
termination provisions regardless of when it is executed. 31 A
"work made for hire" is:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the
scope of his or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for
use as a contribution to a collective work, as a transla-
tion, as a supplementary work, as a part of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, as a compilation, as
an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a
test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a
written instrument signed by them that the work shall
be considered a work made for hire.32
The parties to a grant may not agree that a work shall be
deemed one made "for hire" in order to avoid the termination
provisions if a "for hire" relationship (within the meaning of
section 101) does not in fact exist between them. Such an avoid-
ance device would be contrary to the statutory provision that
"[t]ermination of the grant may be effected notwithstanding any
agreement to the contrary. ' 33 Insofar as a work is made "for
hire" because it has been prepared by an employee within the
scope of his or her employment, it is the relationship that in fact
exists between the parties, and not their description of that rela-
tionship, that is determinative.3 4 The definition quoted above,
", It might be argued that the § 304(c) requirement that copyright be "subsisting
.. . on January 1, 1978" includes works not protected by statutory copyright prior to
the effective date of the new Act, as long as "on" such effective date, i.e., January 1,
1978, by reason of the preemptive provisions of the new Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 301 (West
Supp. IV part 1, 1976), statutory copyright did subsist in such works. What was clearly
intended, however, was that statutory copyright must be "already subsisting when the
new statute becomes effective." H. REP., supra note 8, at 140 (emphasis supplied).
31 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(a), 304(c) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
32
1d. § 101.
" Id. §§ 203(a)(5), 304(c)(5).
14 See I TREATISE, supra note 6, § 62, at 238.1-39.
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while allowing agreements concerning the "for hire" status of
certain classes of works, contains the clear negative implication
that such agreements will be unavailing unless the work is spe-
cially ordered or commissioned and falls within one of the spe-
cially designated categories.
Conversely, may the parties agree that a "work made for
hire" in the statutory sense shall not be considered as made "for
hire" in order to trigger the termination provisions? Generally,
the parties may not by agreement alter the legal consequences
-such as the term of copyright 5 -that flow from the fact that a
work is made "for hire." But the parties may by agreement vary
the ownership between them of rights in a work made "for
hire. '36 This means that the parties to an authorship "for hire"
relationship could incorporate in the employment agreement,
either in haec verba or by reference to the statutory text, termina-
tion provisions identical to those set forth in the Copyright Act.
They would be given effect not by operation of law but by the
consent of the parties. If the parties are legally capable of
agreeing to such termination provisions, the verbal formula em-
ployed to effectuate them should not be regarded as significant.
3. Grants by Will
A "transfer" of copyright as defined by the Act includes any
"conveyance" or "alienation. ' 38 This includes gifts causa mortis
and inter vivos. The termination provisions of the Act,39 however,
expressly exclude any grant by will. 41' Grants by intestacy are not
expressly excluded, but such exclusion is unnecessary because
only those grants that have been "executed" 41 by the author, or
in certain cases by the author's statutory successors, 42 are subject
to termination. A grant by intestate succession occurs by opera-
tion of law, not by virtue of the "execution" of a grant.
35 17 U.S.C.A. § 302(c) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
36Id. § 201(b).
17 See H. REP., supra note 8, at 128: "[N]othing in this section or legislation is in-
tended to change the existing state of the law of contracts concerning the circumstances
in which an author may cancel or terminate a license, transfer, or assignment."
38 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
3 91d. §§ 203, 304(c).
10 See H. REP., supra note 8, at 125: "The right of termination would be confined to
inter vivos transfers or licenses ......
41 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(a), 304(c) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
4 2 See id. § 304(c)(1).
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4. Grants Other Than by the Author
a. Grants by Renewal Claimants
A grant executed on or after January 1, 1978 is subject to
termination only if it has been executed by the author.43 A grant
by joint authors44 is subject to termination even if the grant was
executed by only one of several joint authors.45 A grant executed
before January 1, 1978 is subject to termination 46 if executed
either by the author or authors, or by those statutory successors
entitled to a claim of renewal copyright in place of the author if
the author is not living at the time the renewal vests. Such suc-
cessors include the author's widow or widower, children, ex-
ecutors, or next of kin. 47 The reason grants executed by this
additional class of persons are terminable only if executed before
January 1, 1978 is said to lie in the rule of Fred Fisher Music Co.
v. M. Witmark & Sons. 48 Under that decision, a grant of renewal
rights executed by an author (or presumably by an author's stat-
utory successors) before the renewal vests49 will be binding upon
the grantor when and if the renewal later vests in the grantor.
Thus, an author's spouse may have sold his or her contingent
interest in the renewal long before it vests and even before the
author dies. The new Act does not attempt to change this rule,
but prevents its application to the additional term of years added
to the renewal period. 50 "After the present 28-year renewal
period has ended, a statutory beneficiary who has signed a dis-
4 3 1d. § 203(a). Grants by an employer who by reason of § 20 1(b) is "considered the
author for purposes of this title" are not subject to termination in view of the exclusion
of works made "for hire" from the termination provisions.
4 See I TREATISE, supra note 6, at § 69.
5 This assumes that the grant in the first instance was valid, i.e., that one joint
author acting alone had the power to convey the rights granted. One joint author has
the power to grant a nonexclusive license in a work or to assign his or her entire
interest in a work to a third party. See I TREATISE, supra note 6, at §§ 77-78.
16 As noted above, such grants are terminable only if the work that is the subject of
the grant qualified for statutory copyright either before or after execution of the grant,
but prior to January 1, 1978. Furthermore, the time of termination of such a grant
differs markedly from the time of termination of a grant executed on or after January
1, 1978. See text accompanying notes 149-62 infra (Section IV).
47 17 U.S.C.A. § 304(c)(2) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976); see 2 TREATISE, supra note
6, at§ 115.
48 318 U.S. 643 (1943); see 2 TREATISE, supra note 6, at § 117.21.
11 See 2 TREATISE, supra note 6, at § 116.2.
"' The new Act adds 19 years to the second renewal term for those works already
in statutory copyright as of January 1, 1978. 17 U.S.C.A. § 304(a) (West Supp. IV part
1, 1976).
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advantageous grant of this sort should have the opportunity to
reclaim the extended term."51
It was thought unnecessary to afford this termination right
to an author's statutory successors in the case of grants executed
by them52 on or after January 1, 1978 because of the inalienabil-
ity of the successors' contingent termination rights53 (as com-
pared with the assignability of their contingent renewal rights).
54
But this distinction appears to be based upon the erroneous
assumption that any grant executed by an author on or after
January 1, 1978 necessarily relates to a work having first been
accorded statutory copyright on or after such date. Such works
are not subject to renewal copyright, but may be protected only
for the unitary term of life of the author plus fifty years. An
author's surviving spouse and children cannot alienate their
rights to terminate before termination rights vest: until the
rights revert to them they lack the power to make any additional
grants that might deprive them of the benefits of termination.
Therefore, it was thought unnecessary to provide for termina-
tion rights with respect to grants executed by the surviving
spouse and children.
But a grant executed by an author on or after January 1,
1978 may also relate to a work that was the subject of statutory
copyright prior to such date. With respect to such works, the
renewal structure continues under the new Act. Thus, an
author's spouse or children may execute on or after January 1,
1978 a grant of contingent renewal rights in such a work. Such a
grant would not be subject to termination because it was not
executed by the author. If the renewal rights vest in the surviv-
ing spouse and children (because the author has died prior to
the expiration of the first twenty-eight-year term),55 their prior
grant of such renewal rights will effectively deprive them of any
future interest in the work. They may not thereafter claim ter-
mination of the deceased author's original grant because it will
have previously terminated by operation of law; the effectiveness
5' H. REP.,supra note 8, at 141.
52 An author's surviving spouse and children are entitled to terminate grants exe-
cuted on or after January 1, 1978 if the grant was originally executed by the now-
deceased author. See text accompanying notes 111-18 infra (Section IIA(2)(b)).
5' See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(a)(5), 304(c)(5) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976); text accom-
panying notes 197-208 infra (Section VI).
51 H. REP., supra note 8, at 140-41.
55 See 2 TREATISE, supra note 6, at § 117.3.
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of the author's grant beyond the first copyright term was con-
tingent upon the author's survival. The surviving spouse and
children will not be able to terminate the author's grant until
after the original twenty-eight-year copyright term has ex-
pired.56 Thus, a grant of contingent renewal rights executed by
an author's spouse or children on or after January 1, 1978 may
not be recaptured by them under either the renewal or termina-
tion provisions of the new Act.
With respect to grants executed prior to January 1, 1978,
may an author's successor terminate the grant if the assignment
was executed before the renewal rights vested in such successor?
Such a problem arises, for example, when the spouse of a living
author assigns his or her contingent renewal rights in a work
(which may happen when a publisher is attempting to buy up all
future interests in a work), and the author dies before renewal
vests. In such circumstances, the surviving spouse is clearly enti-
tled to claim the renewal. But will the spouse's grant of contin-
gent renewal rights made before the author's death be subject to
termination under section 304(c)? The language of that section
would suggest not. It describes the persons whose grants are
subject to termination through an incorporation by reference of
the second proviso of section 304(a), and this in turn mentions
"the widow [or] widower . . . if the author be not living."57
Arguably, then, the only grants of renewal rights by an author's
spouse that are terminable are those executed after he or she has
become a widower or widow. Similarly, with respect to each of
56 Termination may not occur until 35 years after execution of the grant, or if the
grant covers the right of publication, 35 years from publication or 40 years from execu-
tion of the grant, whichever is earlier. 17 U.S.C.A. § 203(a)(3) (West Supp. IV part 1,
1976); see text accompanying notes 149-55 infra (Section IVA). But here the first
28-year term of statutory copyright began before January 1, 1978, hypothetically the
earliest possible date of the grant.
57 17 U.S.C.A. § 304(a) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976). "[T]he persons designated by
the second proviso of subsection (a) of this section [304]" are those entitled to claim
renewal. Id. § 304(c) Section 304(a) is the renewal provision of the Act (incorporated
from the 1909 Act), and its second proviso speaks of "the author of such work, if still
living, or the widow, widower, or children of the author, if the author be not living, or
if such author, widow, widower, or children be not living, then the author's executors,
or in the absence of a will, his or her next of kin." Only these persons are entitled to
claim renewal copyright in the event the author is not living when renewal vests. Thus,
only an author's widow or widower, and not the spouse of a living author, is entitled to
claim renewal. Because terminable grants executed prior to January 1, 1978 must per-
tain to renewal rights, only a grant by one who at the time of vesting is the widow or
widower, not the spouse of a living author, is subject to termination. If the author is
still living when the renewal vests, a purported grant of renewal by the spouse is a
nullity.
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the succeeding classes mentioned in the second proviso of sec-
tion 304(a), perhaps the only grants by them that are terminable
are those executed at a time when there were no members of a
prior class in whom the renewal rights might vest.58 But such a
construction is unduly restrictive. According to the House Report,
grants executed by persons other than the author were made
terminable under the new Act in order to counter the Witmark
rule that
any statutory beneficiary of the author can make a valid
transfer or license of future renewal rights, which is
completely binding if the author is dead and the person
who executed the grant turns out to be the proper re-
newal claimant .... After the present 28-year renewal
period has ended, a statutory beneficiary who has
signed a disadvantageous grant of this sort should have
the opportunity to reclaim the extended term.
59
The objective of permitting termination of such grants can be
fully achieved only if grants executed by a "statutory beneficiary"
are terminable even if such grantor turns out to be the proper
renewal claimant only after execution of the grant.
b. Grants by Transferees
Suppose that author A grants copyright in her work to B,
and B in turn grants such copyright to C. A clearly has a right of
termination against B. Because the grant to C was executed
neither by the author, nor by a renewal claimant, 611 no statutory
right of termination exists against C. This should not mean that
C may continue to enjoy the benefit of his grant from B although
B's rights have been terminated by A. C's rights should be cut off
simply because he can succeed to no greater rights than B had
the power to convey. If the original grant from A to B had by its
terms provided for a reversion to A 61 thirty-five years after ex-
ecution, B would lack the power to convey rights to C beyond
such thirty-five-year period. The fact that reversion from B to
' The children, however, fall within the same class as the widow or widower. See 2
TREATISE, supra note 6, at § 115.1.
59 H. REP., supra note 8, at 140-41.
61 A grant executed by a renewal claimant is, in any event, terminable only if it was
executed prior to January 1, 1978. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
61 See, e.g., Mailer v. RKO Teleradio Pictures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 294 (S.D.N.Y.
1963) (reversionary clause in assignment of rights to protect assigner from abandon-
ment of film project), afffd, 332 F.2d 747 (2d Cir. 1964).
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A occurs by operation of law rather than by the express terms
of the grant to B does not enlarge the rights that B can convey
to C.
6 2
B. What Rights Are Subject to Termination?
1. In General-Works, Titles, and Characters
Only such rights as were originally the subject of a grant will
revert upon the termination of that grant. Moreover, to the ex-
tent that a grant includes rights based upon federal law other
than the Copyright Act, state law, or foreign law, such rights are
not subject to termination.
6 3
Because the title of a work is not subject to copyright,64 the
grant of a right to use a title arguably does not terminate upon
the termination of rights in the work bearing the title.6 5 The law
of unfair competition, however, which is the source of title
protection, 66 should of its own force terminate the right to use a
title in one who no longer has any right in the work to which the
title refers.
67
To the extent that a fictional character is not protected by
copyright, 68 a grant of the right to use the character in sequels
6 9
would appear not to be subject to termination. But the premise
of noncopyrightability of characters is questionable.7Y1
2. Effect of Termination When
Foreign Rights Are Involved
A grant of copyright "throughout the world" is terminable
only with respect to uses within the geographic limits of the
United States. Because copyright has no extraterritorial op-
1 Cf Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1977) (if assignor pur-
ports to grant renewal rights but dies before renewal vesting, and assignee produces
motion picture before commencement of renewal term, the assignee may continue to ex-
hibit the motion picture during the renewal period).
63 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(b)(5), 304(c)(6)(E) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
64 See 1 TREATISE, supra note 5, § 34, at 140.
65 See Stein, Termination of Transfers and Licenses Under the New Copyright Act: Thorn)y
Problems For the Copyright Bar, to be published in 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. (June, 1977).
6 See 1 TREATISE, supra note 6, § 34, at 141-46.2.
67 The owner of a literary work may claim rights in the title of the work if such title
acquires a secondary meaning. See, e.g., Tomlin v. Walt Disney Prods., 18 Cal. App. 3d
226, 230, 96 Cal. Rptr. 118, 120 (1971).
6" See I TREATISE, supra note 6, at § 30.
69 See 2 id., § 129.2.
"' See 1 id., § 30, at 134.1-35.
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eration, 71 arguably American law is precluded from causing the
termination of rights based upon foreign copyright laws. A re-
sponse to this argument is that the nonextraterritoriality of
copyright is irrelevant because the question here is one of con-
tract law, not copyright law, in that it concerns the effect of a
contract granting certain rights. The contract law of one nation
may be applicable in another nation under the latter's conflict-
of-laws rule. 2 The conclusive answer to this problem lies in the
text of the termination provisions of the Copyright Act, which
expressly provide that statutory termination "in no way affects
rights arising under ... foreign laws" 73 -that is, under foreign
copyright (not contract) laws. Thus, even if the conflicts rule of a
foreign nation were to call for application of the American ter-
mination rule as a rule of contract law, that rule by its own terms
excepts from termination the grant of those rights arising under
foreign copyright laws.
3. Limitations on Termination of Derivative Work Rights
The Copyright Act provides that notwithstanding a termina-
tion of rights thereunder:
A derivative work prepared under authority of the
grant before its termination may continue to be utilized
under the terms of the grant after its termination, but
this privilege does not extend to the preparation after
the termination of other derivative works based upon
the copyrighted work covered by the terminated
grant.
74
Thus, a grant of motion-picture rights in a novel will au-
thorize the preparation of a motion picture based upon the
novel; even after the statutory termination7 5 of such a grant, the
grantee will continue to have the right to "utilize" the film made
pursuant thereto. 6 In such circumstances, a grantee would not
7 See id., § 65.61, at 263.
72 This issue is discussed at greater length in 2 id. § 120.4.
73 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(b)(5), 304(c)(6)(E) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
74 Id. §§ 203(b)(1), 304(c)(6)(A).
75 A termination by the express terms of the grant (rather than by reason of the
statutory termination provisions) may terminate even the right to utilize further the
previously prepared derivative work. See 1 TREATISE, supra note 6, at § 45.2.
76 H. REP., supra note 8, at 127. The Second Circuit recently applied this rule, by
analogy, to the renewal context. Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.
1977).
1977]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:947
have the right after termination to prepare a new motion picture
based upon the same novel." Unfortunately, even regarding the
grantee's rights with respect to the motion picture prepared
prior to termination there is some ambiguity. Clearly, the gran-
tee may continue to exhibit film prints of the motion picture.
But after termination may the grantee make new negatives and
prints of the previously created motion picture? In the absence
of a grant such conduct would infringe the novel copyright
owner's right of reproduction.7 8 Arguably, the grantee's continu-
ing right to "utilize" the derivative work after termination merely
permits continued exercise of the right of public performance by
exhibition of the film, but not the right of reproduction of nega-
tives and prints.7 9 The better view, however, is that a motion
picture may not continue to be "utilized" in any practical sense
unless the grantee has a continuing right to make new prints
(and perhaps also new negatives); thus, such right or rights
would continue notwithstanding termination. Producing new
prints and even new negatives (if not reedited) should be treated
as making new copies of a work in order to "utilize" it rather
than as creating new derivative works.
Under the new Act, a motion picture and the screen play
upon which the motion picture is based arguably constitute a
joint work.8 "1 Does this mean that upon termination of rights in
the screenplay, there is no continuing right to "utilize" the mo-
tion picture based thereon because such continuing right applies
only to a "derivative work?"8' The House Report expresses the
view that "[f]or this purpose, a motion picture would be consid-
ered a 'derivative work' with respect to every 'preexisting work'
incorporated in it, whether the preexisting work was created
independently [as in the case of a novel] or was prepared ex-
pressly for the motion picture [as in the case of a screenplay]. 8 2
", H. REP., supra note 8, at 127; see also 2 TREATISE, supra note 6, at § 129.6.
78 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 106(1) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
79 The House Report states: "In other words, a film made from a play could con-
tinue to be licensed for performance . . . ." H. REP., supra note 8, at 127; cf. REcISTER
REPORT, supra note 16, at 76 (speaks of the continuing right "to distribute and perform"
a film).
"0 See H. REP., supra note 8, at 120. Contrast this situation with that of a movie and
a novel on which it is based. The movie is unquestionably derivative from the underly-
ing novel.
s1 Admittedly, this question is largely academic, because most screenplays are works
made "for hire," and therefore the termination provisions are inapplicable to them.
82 H. REP., supra note 8, at 127.
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Suppose the publication rights previously granted to a book
publisher are terminated. Suppose further that the book as
theretofore published included not only the author's manuscript,
but also a special introduction prepared by someone else. May
the publisher claim that the combination of manuscript and in-
troduction renders the book as published a "derivative work,"
and therefore subject to the publisher's right to continue to
"utilize" the work? Probably not. The work would not be re-
garded as a derivative work because the author's manuscript has
not been recast or transformed.8 3 But suppose the publisher
prior to publication made a number of editorial changes in the
manuscript and claims to have thereby published a "derivative
work" for further "utilization" purposes. In most cases, such
editorial revisions probably would be regarded as too minimal to
warrant characterizing the result as a derivative work.84 But if
such characterization were found to be appropriate, would the
publisher merely have the right to continue to sell those copies
of the book printed prior to termination, or would it have the
further right to print new copies of the book? As with new prints
of old movies, new copies probably may be printed because this
would not constitute "the preparation after the termination of
other derivative works," 85 but only of other copies of the same
derivative work.
II. WHO HAS THE RIGHT TO TERMINATE?
A. Grants Executed by the Author
1. If the Author Survives to the Termination
Vesting-In General and for Joint Authors
If the author survives to the vesting of the termination
right,8 6 he or she has the right to the reversion of the granted
interest.87 As we shall see below, the termination right vests upon
the service of a termination notice on the transferee of the in-
terest in the work. This means that if the author serves a notice,
but dies before termination occurs, the author's estate, and not
his or her statutory successors, takes the reversion. But if the
83 See id. 57.
84 See I TREATISE, supra note 6, at § 40.
85 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(b)(1), 304(c)(6)(A) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
16 See text accompanying notes 124-27 infra (Section IIA(3)).
87 17 U.S.G.A. §§ 203(a)(1), 304(c)(I) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
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author merely survives to a date at which he or she could serve a
termination notice, but dies without serving one, the statutory
successors, and not the estate, gain the right to serve such a
notice and to enjoy the interests that subsequently revert by
reason of such notice.
With respect to grants executed by two or more joint
authors,8 8 a distinction is made between grants executed prior to
January 1, 1978 and those executed on or after such date. A
grant executed on or after January 1, 1978 may be terminated
only by a majority of the joint authors who executed it.
Before examining the meaning of "majority," it should be
noted that a joint author may not "transfer" a greater copyright
interest in a work than he or she owns. Thus, the author may
transfer to another his or her share of the copyright and may
grant a nonexclusive license in the entire work without the con-
sent of any other joint author (subject to a duty to account to the
nongranting joint authors). But the author may not grant an
exclusive license of rights, nor may he or she transfer more than a
proportionate interest in the entire work.89 When fewer than all
joint authors are empowered to act as agents for all in making an
exclusive grant of rights, such a grant should be considered as
having been made by all joint authors for purposes of deciding
who may terminate.
The majority-joint-author rule should operate in the follow-
ing fashion. If only two joint authors joined in a grant, both
must agree to terminate. If three joint authors joined in a grant,
any two of them have the power to terminate98 " Suppose that a
work is written by five joint authors, only three of whom join in
executing a grant either of their interest in the copyright or of a
nonexclusive license of the work. Any two of the three executing
joint authors may terminate the grant. It would not be sufficient
for the two nonexecuting joint authors to join only one execut-
88 Concerning what constitutes joint authorship, see id. § 101 (definition of "joint
work"); 1 TREATISE, supra note 6, at § 69.
8
9 Joint ownership of copyright is conceptualized as a tenancy in common. A tenant
in common may grant nonexclusive licenses in the jointly authored work or may trans-
fer his or her share of the tenancy in common (may sell or give away his or her share
of the copyright). The tenant may not use the tenancy so as to exclude co-tenants from
similar use (may not grant an exclusive license nor assign an exclusive ownership in the
work). See 1 TREATISE, supra note 6, at §§ 76-78.
9' This seems to be true even if the three joint authors shared the work unequally
(say, 60%, 20%, 20%) and only the two minority authors voted to terminate. 17
U.S.C.A. § 203(a)(1) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976) speaks only of a majority of "au-
thors" not of authors' interests.
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ing joint author for termination purposes: the three together
would not constitute a majority of the authors who executed the
grant.91 If two of three executing joint authors join in a termina-
tion (regardless of how many authors wrote the work), they
thereby terminate the rights granted by the third executing joint
author. It is the grant per se, and not merely the terminating
authors' respective grants of rights therein, that is terminated. A
termination by two of the three executing joint authors also af-
fects the rights of the remaining joint authors who neither joined
in the original execution of the grant nor in its subsequent ter-
mination. Whatever rights were properly conveyed in a joint
work are terminated if the requisite number of authors who
made the grant join in the termination. This is true even though
the grant and its termination may affect (either favorably or
adversely) the rights of nongranting joint authors.
92
Grants executed by two or more joint authors prior to
January 1, 197893 are terminable by each executing joint author
even if a majority of the executing joint authors do not join in
such termination. The termination is effective, however, only
with respect to the interest of the terminating joint author, not
with respect to the interests of the other executing joint authors.
Suppose, for example, that a work is jointly written by A, B, and
C, who share the copyright equally. If all three joint authors join
in executing a grant of renewal rights in the work to D in ad-
vance of the vesting of such rights, and if all three authors sur-
vive to the time of such vesting, then absent any termination of
the grant, D will be entitled to the renewal term of copyright in
the work.94 Suppose at the time the authors are able to terminate
A wishes to terminate the grant, but neither B nor C is willing to
join in the termination. As indicated above, if this were a grant
91 If the grant was of a nonexclusive license, the majority-termination right may
prove illusory without unanimous agreement to terminate. A single joint author may be
able to grant such a license; any author who does not wish the grant to terminate may
remake it immediately upon termination. The effect of such a termination would be to
free the terminating joint authors of any contractual restrictions on their further grants
of nonexclusive licenses. But see note 217 infra & accompanying text, suggesting that
only a majority of those who made the grant (and therefore had the right to terminate)
may regrant the terminated rights.
92 This is also true of grants executed prior to January 1, 1978, although, as indi-
cated below, the requisite number of authors required for termination differs with re-
spect to such grants.
9' Such grants are terminable only if they are of renewal rights. See 17 U.S.C.A.
§ 304(c) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
94 See 2 TREATISE, supra note 6, at § 117.2.
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executed on or after January 1, 1978, no termination could
occur because the consent of a majority of joint owners is re-
quired for this purpose. With regard to grants executed prior to
January 1, 1978, A alone may terminate his grant to D, but such
a termination will not divest D of the rights she acquired under
the grant from the nonterminating joint authors, B and C. D and
A will thus become tenants in common of the rights in the work
granted by A, B, and C. If the rights granted to D were exclusive,
the termination will make the rights nonexclusive and both A
and D will have power to grant licenses. 95
Why may only a majority of joint authors (or successors)
terminate a grant executed after the effective date of the new
Act, while any individual executing joint owner may terminate a
grant executed prior to the effective date? The rationale for this
distinction that is suggested in the House Report96 relates to the
legal consequence of the failure of a grantor of renewal rights to
survive until such rights vest. In such circumstances, the renewal
rights pass to the grantor's statutory successors97 and the original
grantee takes nothing from the original grantor. Thus, in the
above hypothetical, if B does not survive until the renewal in-
terests vests, then upon such vesting B's widow and children will
be entitled to B's interest in the renewal rights, and D will ac-
quire nothing from B. If A and C survive until vesting, however,
D will nevertheless acquire their respective interests in the re-
newal. Thus, B's grant will have terminated by operation of law,
although neither A nor C joined in such termination and their
respective grants of rights to D are not terminated. 98 Because
joint-author grants of renewal rights thus terminate individually
by operation of law upon an author's death, it was thought
"inappropriate" 99 to require anything more than individual ter-
mination via the termination provisions.
But this reasoning does not convincingly justify the distinc-
tion between grants executed before and after the effective date
of the new Act. Logically, such an argument would point instead
to a distinction between vested and contingent rights. After all, a
9 Cf. Sweet Music, Inc. v. Melrose Music Corp., 189 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Cal. 1960)
(two joint authors assigned contingent renewal rights in one instrument, one died be-
fore vesting of renewal right, renewal right shared by assignee and successors of de-
ceased); 2 TREATISE, supra note 6, § 117.23, at 502 (renewal problem).
96 H. REP., supra note 8, at 141.
" See 2 TREATISE, supra note 6, at § 115.
9 8 But see id. § 117.23, at 500.
99 H. REP., supra note 8, at 141.
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grant made prior to January 1, 1978 could have been executed
after the first copyright term and thus could be a grant of a
vested right. It would still be a grant of the renewal copyright
and hence subject to termination under section 304(c). But if
any of the grantors die after the execution of the grant, the
grantee's rights will not be divested in any degree, and individual
termination by operation of law will not occur. Yet individual
termination is possible under the termination provisions. On the
other hand, a grant executed on or after January 1, 1978 is
subject to termination under the provisions of section 203(a)
even if it is a grant of renewal rights in a work in statutory
copyright before that date.'00 If such a grant is one of contingent
rights, made in the first term of copyright, it would be subject to
individual termination by operation of law, as discussed above.
Yet in this case it was not thought "inappropriate" to require
majority consent for termination. Because individual termination
by operation of law is never a possibility in the case of vested
rights and always a possibility in the case of contingent rights, it
seems odd that Congress did not base an exception to majority
termination on the vested-contingent distinction, rather than on
the effective date of the Act.
2. If the Author Does Not Survive
to the Termination Vesting
a. Ownership of the Termination Interest upon the Author's Death
If an author dies before the rights subject to termination
have been vested in him or her by such termination, 1"" the
author's termination interest passes to the author's surviving
spouse and children (and in some cases, grandchildren) in the
proportions described below. This ownership of a deceased
author's termination interest bears on the determination of three
different questions. First, who is entitled to cause termination? 
112
100 Grants executed on or after January 1, 1978 are subject to termination under
§ 203(a) regardless of when the work was created and whether or not renewal rights
are thereby granted. Only works created and in statutory copyright prior to January 1,
1978, however, are subject to a renewal term. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 304 (West Supp. IV
part 1, 1976).
"I For discussion of the time of vesting, see text accompanying notes 123-27 infra
(Section IIA(3)). Of course, if the author survives until vesting, the author owns the
rights thus terminated. If the author dies thereafter, the rights that have thus vested
in the author pass with the remainder of his or her estate by will or intestacy.
102 Text accompanying notes 111-22 infra (Section IIA(2)(b)-(c)).
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Second, who are the recipients of the rights thus terminated?, 3
Third, who may make further grants of the rights thus termi-
nated?13 4 Among those who own a particular termination in-
terest, the individuals who perform each of the three functions
specified above may vary. Before considering which individuals
may perform each particular function, we must describe the
composition and proportionate ownership of those who succeed
to a deceased author's termination interest. The successors in-
clude:
(1) The widow or widower.13 5 A surviving spouse owns the
entire termination interest if the author has left no surviving
children or grandchildren. If the author has left any surviving
children or grandchildren, the surviving spouse owns one-half of
the termination interest. 
11
6
(2) The author's surviving children?t 7 If there is no surviv-
ing spouse, the children own the entire termination interest,
equally divided among them. ""' If there is a surviving spouse,
the children own one-half of the termination interest, also
equally divided among them.
(3) The author's surviving grandchildren. With respect to
any child of the author who does not survive to the termination
vesting,' "9 any surviving children of such nonsurviving child own
in equal shares the termination interest that such nonsurviving
child would have owned had he survived the author.
If, upon the death of an author prior to the vesting of the
termination right, there is no surviving spouse, and no surviving
children or grandchildren, no one may exercise the right of
termination under the Act. ""
1"3 Text accompanying notes 140-48 infra (Section III).
"'4 Text accompanying notes 216-20 infra (Section VIIB).
105 "The author's 'widow' or 'widower' is the author's surviving spouse under the
law of his domicile at the time of his death, whether or not the spouse has later remar-
ried." 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
16 Id. §§ 203(a)(2)(A), 304(c)(2)(A).
107 "A person's 'children' are that person's immediate offspring, whether legitimate
or not, and any children legally adopted by that person." Id. § 101.
1,8 If a surviving child (or grandchild as discussed below) is under the age of con-
sent, the child's termination interest may be exercised by a legally appointed guardian,
who would constitute a "duly authorized agent" within the meaning of § 203(a)(4) and
§ 304(c)(4). H. REP., supra note 8, at 126.
1 9 A deceased child's termination interest passes to his or her children (the
author's grandchildren) whether or not such child predeceased the author, as long as
both the child and the author died prior to the vesting of the termination interest. If
the child died after such vesting, then the termination rights pass to the child's estate.
" In this respect the termination right differs from the renewal right, which in the
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b. The Majority Requirement
If a grant is executed by an author who does not survive
until the vesting of the termination interest,"' a statutorily de-
fined "per stirpes majority" of those who succeed to the deceased
author's termination interest" 2 is entitled to terminate the grant.
This majority requirement is applicable to grants executed by an
author both prior to"13 and after 1 4 January 1, 1978. Because the
surviving spouse, if there is one, owns one-half of the deceased
author's termination interest,'1 5 he or she must join in any ter-
mination. Also, if there are surviving children or grandchildren,
at least one such child's interest must be joined in a termination
before a majority of those entitled to exercise the termination
interest could be constituted. If there is no surviving spouse,
then a majority of these children are required to join in a termi-
nation. If an author's child does not survive to termination vest-
ing, but one or more children of such deceased child do survive,
then these grandchildren share equally the interest that would
otherwise have belonged to their deceased parent (the author's
deceased child).
The termination interest of the grandchildren, however,
may be exercised only upon agreement by a majority of them."
6
Suppose, for example, that a deceased author leaves a surviv-
ing spouse, two surviving children, three children of a daugh-
ter who has predeceased the vesting of the termination interest,
and two children of a predeceased son. If the surviving spouse
wishes to terminate, but the two surviving children do not, then
in order to achieve a majority it would be necessary that two of
the children of the daughter or both children of the son join
with the surviving spouse. A single child of each predeceased
child together with the surviving spouse would not be sufficient
to constitute a majority because each group of grandchildren
may act only by majority action. 1 7 But one child of the author
absence of a surviving spouse and children passes to the author's executor or next of
kin. See 2 TREATISE, supra note 6, at §§ 115.2-.3.
Il On when termination rights vest, see text accompanying notes 123-27 infra (Sec-
tion IIA(3)).
'2See text accompanying notes 1O1-l0supra (Section IIA(2)(a)).
113 17 U.S.C.A. § 304(c) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
14 Id. § 203(a).
115 For the respective ownership interests of the surviving spouse, children, and
grandchildren, see text accompanying notes 10 1-10 supra (Section IIA(2)(a)).
116 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(a)(2)(C), 304(c)(2)(C) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
117 See H. REP., supra note 8, at 125-26.
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may join with the surviving spouse and thereby constitute a ma-
jority of those owning a termination interest, even if a majority
of the surviving children oppose termination. Similarly, if an
author leaves no surviving spouse or children, but three children
of a deceased daughter and two of a deceased son, the author's
grants may be terminated by both of the son's children and two
of the daughter's but the three children of the daughter or both
of the son's and one of the daughter's could not terminate alone.
Although the rights of the children, like those of the grandchil-
dren, are divided equally among them and "exercised on a per
stirpes basis," 118 majority action is required with respect to the
entire termination interest, and also within each class of grand-
children, but not within the class of children.
c. When the Nonsurvivor Is a Joint Author
If a grant is executed by two or more joint authors, and one
joint author does not survive until the termination vesting, the
termination interest of that deceased author may be exercised by
a majority (determined by the rules discussed above) of those
who succeed to ownership of the interest. 119 Whether such a
majority may terminate its deceased joint author's grant without
the consent of any of the other joint authors who joined in the
execution of the grant, or whether termination may occur only if
a majority of the joint owners 2 " join in the termination, will
depend upon when the grant was executed. If execution oc-
curred on or after January 1, 1978, majority approval of the
joint authors (or those who control the respective termination
interests of deceased joint authors) is required, in the same
manner as majority consent of joint authors would be required if
all of them survived to the termination vesting.' 2 ' If execution
occurred prior to January 1, 1978, those who control a given
deceased joint author's termination interest may terminate with-
out joining the other joint authors or their representatives, in the
same manner as would be permitted if all of the joint authors
had survived to the termination vesting.
122
118 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(a)(2)(C), 304(c)(2)(C) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
"9 Id. §§ 203(a)(1), 304(c)(1).
120 In each case, the termination interest of a joint author who died before vesting
would be controlled by the majority vote of the deceased author's surviving spouse,
children, and grandchildren, as described above. See id. §§ 203(a), 304(c).
121 See text accompanying notes 86-100 supra (Section IIA(1)).
122 Id.
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3. When and in Whom Do Termination Rights Vest?
Although the rights subject to termination 123 do not revert
until the termination date specified in the notice of termination,
the rights of those who are recipients of the terminated rights124
vest upon the date the notice of termination is served. 125 There-
fore, the class of those who may claim as recipients of the termi-
nated rights is determined as of the date the termination notice
is served. If an author serves a notice of termination of a grant
he or she had made, but dies prior to the date of termination
specified in the notice, the terminated rights will pass to the
author's estate, not to the surviving spouse and children. If, on
the other hand, the author dies prior to service of the notice of
termination, even if he or she dies after commencement of the
time when such notice could have been served, 26 service of the
notice by the surviving spouse and children will vest the termi-
nated rights in them rather than in the deceased author's estate.
The executor of the author's estate may not serve a notice on the
estate's behalf. This distinction will prove important when the
author's will disposes of the author's estate to persons other than
the surviving spouse and children, or distributes the estate to
them in different proportions than they would be entitled to
take as statutory successors to the termination interest. 1 27 Simi-
larly, if a deceased author's spouse and children join in serving a
termination notice, but the spouse dies before the date of termi-
nation specified in the notice, the spouse's estate will be entitled
to the spouse's share of the termination interest; if the spouse
dies before service of the termination notice, the children, upon
service of a notice, will be entitled to the entire termination
interest.
B. Grants Executed by Persons Other Than the Author
Grants executed on or after January 1, 1978 are subject to
termination only if executed by the author.' 28 Grants (of renewal
rights) executed prior to January 1, 1978, however, are subject
12 Text accompanying notes 63-85 supra (Section IB).
124 The recipients are discussed at text accompanying notes 140-48 infra (Section
III).
121 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(b)(2), 304(c)(6)(B) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
126 Text accompanying notes 163-82 infra (Section VA).
127 Text accompanying notes 101-10 supra (Section IIA(2)(a)).
128 17 U.S.C.A. § 203(a) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
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to termination if executed either by the author or by any of the
author's successor renewal claimants-the author's surviving
spouse, children, executors, or next of kin. 129 Who among these
renewal claimants may terminate a grant executed by any of
them? The answer is that "the surviving person or persons who
executed it" may terminate the grant.
13
11
The House Report makes clear that all of the persons still
surviving who joined in a grant of renewal rights must join in the
termination. 13 1 In particular, a single grantor may not terminate
his or her portion of the grant (unless he or she is the sole
survivor), and a nonunanimous majority may not terminate the
grant. This is in contrast to grants executed by an author who
does not survive until termination vesting. Such author-executed
grants (whether executed before, on, or after January 1, 1978)
may be terminated by majority action of the deceased author's
surviving spouse, children, and grandchildren. 32 In the case of
grants executed by renewal beneficiaries, if anything less than
the unanimous approval of the beneficiaries were to be required,
it would necessitate deciding whether a surviving spouse owns a
one-half interest in the renewal (and is therefore entitled to a
fifty percent voting interest in termination) or whether his or her
interest is no greater than that of each of the surviving children.
Because this issue was unclear under the 1909 Act, and remains
unclear under the renewal provisions incorporated from the
1909 Act into the new Act,' 33 avoiding the question for termina-
tion purposes by requiring unanimous approval was thought
prudent. 3
4
Note that the unanimous consent of just the renewal ben-
eficiaries who joined in a given grant is required for termination.
Moreover, with regard to the executing beneficiaries, the con-
sent of only "the surviving person or persons who executed" a
129 Id. § 304(c).
130 Id. § 304(c)(1).
' 31"[W]here the grant was executed by a person or persons other than the author,
termination can be effected only by the unanimous action of the survivors of those who
executed it." H. REP., supra note 8, at 141.
13'2 Text accompanying notes 111-18 supra (Section IIA(2)(b)).
' See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956); 2 TREATISE, supra note 6, at
§ 115.11.
134 H. REP., supra note 8, at 141. The House Report adds that "greater difficulties
would be presented if any attempt were made to apply the majority principle to further
beneficiaries in cases where one or more of the renewal beneficiaries are dead." Id.
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grant is required for termination. 135 Does this require survival
until the renewal vests or until the termination vests?136 The
language clearly must refer to survival until the termination vest-
ing because failure to survive until renewal vesting would mean
that the grant of contingent renewal rights is ineffective 137 and
hence would not require termination.
If all or some of the renewal beneficiaries who join in a
given grant of renewal rights survive until the renewal vesting,
but none of them survives until the termination vesting, the
grant is not terminable. The right of termination does not pass
to the inter vivos or causa mortis successors of such nonsurviving
beneficiaries because a condition to the right of termination is
that the grantors (and not their successors) survive until the ter-
mination vesting.1
38
The principle of unanimity is likewise applicable to grants
executed by renewal beneficiaries of joint authors. If joint au-
thors A, B, and C are all dead at the time of renewal vesting, a
grant of renewal rights executed by all three surviving spouses
and all surviving children could be terminated only by the con-
sent of all surviving grantors; the surviving statutory successors
of A and B could not terminate alone. If, however, only A's
widower and children (or the widower alone) had executed the
grant of renewal rights, 39 termination of such grant would re-
quire only the consent of the surviving executing grantor(s).
III. WHO ARE THE RECIPIENTS OF TERMINATED RIGHTS?
Anyone who had the right to terminate a given grant, 41 not
just someone who in fact joined in requesting the termination,1
4 '
will own the rights thus terminated 42 to the extent of his or her
135 17 U.S.C.A. § 304(c)(1) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976) (emphasis supplied).
136 The two vesting periods come at different times. Conpare 2 TREATISE, supra note
6, at § 116.2, with text accompanying notes 123-27 supra (Section IIA(3)).
17 See 2 TREATISE, supra note 6, at § 117.3.
138 17 U.S.C.A. § 304(c)(1) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
"' This would mean that only nonexclusive rights could have been granted. See I
TREATISE, supra note 6, at § 77.
140 Text accompanying notes 86-139 supra (Section II).
141 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(b), 304(c)(6) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976). As indicated at
text accompanying notes 86-139 supra (Section II), with respect to grants executed be-
fore January 1, 1978 by persons other than the author, those who have the right to
terminate and those who in fact terminate necessarily constitute the same group of
persons.
142 See H. REP., supra note 8, at 127.
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proportionate share of the termination interest. 143 Thus, if an
author does not survive to the termination vesting, and the
author's successors terminate, the rights that the author thereto-
fore granted will revert to his or her surviving spouse, children,
and surviving children of the author's predeceased children, in-
cluding those among them who were not a part of the majority
that effectuated the termination. Rights granted on or after
January 1, 1978 by joint authors will revert to all of the granting
joint authors and not merely to the majority of the joint authors
who joined in termination. Rights granted prior to January 1,
1978 by joint authors will revert to each individual joint author
who terminates, and will not inure to the other joint authors,
because each joint author has the right to terminate only with
respect to his or her own interest in the grant. 44 A joint author
who did not join in the execution of a given grant in his or her
work (whenever executed) will not be the recipient of rights
upon termination of such a grant because the author was not
eligible to join in the demand for termination.
45
Rights granted before January 1, 1978 by persons other
than the author as renewal successors 46 will revert to all of those
who executed the grant who survive until the termination
vesting.' 47 But the Act does not specify the proportionate owner-
ship of each of the surviving renewal successors in the rights
thus returned to them. The successors own the reverted rights in
the same proportion as they would have owned them if no such
grant had been executed in the first instance. 148
'43 See text accompanying notes 101-10 supra (Section IIA(2)(a)).
144 On the respective rights to terminate a grant in a work of joint authorship pre-
and post-January 1, 1978, see text accompanying notes 86-100 supra (Section IA(1)).
14- See id.
146 Text accompanying notes 43-62 supra (Section IA(4)).
147 17 U.S.C.A. § 304(c)(6) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976). Note that all those who
executed the grant and who survived until the termination vesting must join in the
decision to terminate. See text accompanying notes 128-39 supra (Section IIB).
148 The proportionate interest, however, is based upon the composition of the
grantor class as of the time termination rights vest, not as of the time the grant was
executed. Thus, if three of the author's children join in a grant of renewal rights, all
three survive until the renewal vesting, but only two survive until the termination vest-
ing, the rights that revert by termination will be divided equally between the two surviv-
ing children, and neither the spouse and children nor the heirs of the deceased child
will have any interest in such rights. This is true because such rights "revert ... to all
those entitled to terminate the grant," 17 U.S.C.A. § 304(c)(6) (West Supp. IV part 1,
1976), and those "entitled to terminate the grant" are limited to "the surviving person or
persons who executed it," id. § 304(c)(1) (emphasis supplied). See generaly 2 TREATISE,
supra note 6, at § 115.11.
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IV. WHEN MAY TERMINATION BE EFFECTED?
A. Grants Executed on or AfterJanuay 1, 1978
Termination of grants executed on or after January 1, 1978
generally may be "effected at any time during a period of five
years beginning at the end of thirty-five years from the date of
execution of the grant."'1 49 In the case of a grant that "covers the
right of publication of the work, the [five year] period begins at
the end of thirty-five years from the date of publication'5 of the
work under the grant or at the end of forty years from the date
of execution of the grant, whichever term ends earlier."'151 This
alternative period was added at the behest of book publishers
who argued that a straight period of thirty-five years from ex-
ecution of the grant could give them a shorter time to exploit a
work, because a number of publication contracts are signed be-
fore the work is written, and years may elapse before it is com-
pleted and published.
152
Note that this argument assumes that a "grant" or "transfer"
of copyright may be executed before a work is written and there-
fore before it enters statutory copyright under the new Act. The
Register Report accepts the publishers' rationale, which suggests
that the Copyright Office may believe that the termination
period of a grant should be calculated from the date that the
agreement is executed and not the date that the copyright in-
terest is transferred. For unwritten (or otherwise unfixed) works
this makes sense because the date that the work is fixed (and
copyright is created and transferred) will be impossible to de-
termine.1
53
Suppose a grant includes both book-publication rights and
other rights, such as motion-picture and stage rights. 54 Clearly
149 17 U.S.C.A. § 203(a)(3) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
15"See 1 TREATISE, supra note 6, at §§ 46-59.
151 17 U.S.C.A. § 203(a)(3) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
152 See REGISTER REPORT, supra note 16, at 75. See also H. REP., supra note 8, at 126.
153 Compare REGISTER REPORT, supra note 16, at 75, with H. REP., supra note 8, at
126 (which does not mention unfixed works).
154 In a technical sense, a motion picture is as susceptible to publication as a book.
See I TREATISE, supra note 6, at § 56. This is not true of stage rights. See 1 TREATISE,
supra note 6, at § 53. It is arguable, therefore, that the alternative measure is triggered
by a grant of "the right of publication," 17 U.S.C.A. § 203(a)(3) (West Supp. IV part 1,
1976), regardless of whether the copies published pursuant thereto consist of conven-
tional printed matter, motion-picture prints, or any other tangible copies. The alterna-
tive measure was probably intended to be triggered, however, only by a grant of what is
referred to in industry usage as "publication rights," which is limited to book and
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insofar as book-publication rights are concerned, the alternative
measure of thirty-five years from publication or forty years from
execution would be applicable. Would that same alternative
measure be applicable to the grant of other rights, or would
these be subject to the straight thirty-five-years-from-execution
rule? The statutory text is ambiguous on this point, and the
legislative history does not address it. Arguably, because the al-
ternative measure is applicable not merely to the grant of publi-
cation rights, but to any grant that "covers"'155 publication rights,
the grant per se (including those aspects of it that do not apply
to publication) is subject to the alternative measure. The alterna-
tive measure should be limited, however, to the grant of publica-
tion rights within a given instrument and the straight thirty-
five-years-from-execution measure should be applied to the
other rights granted within the same instrument. Otherwise an
undue importance is given to the form of conveyance: If one
instrument transfers both book-publication and stage rights, the
latter would be subject to the alternative measure, although if
the parties simultaneously execute two separate instruments, one
for book-publication and the other for stage rights, the alterna-
tive measure would not be applicable to the stage rights. Con-
gress probably did not intend to exalt form bearing no relation
to substance.
B. Grants Executed Prior to January 1, 1978
Termination of grants executed prior to January 1, 1978
may be "effected at any time during a period of five years be-
ginning at the end of fifty-six years from the date copyright was
originally secured, or beginning on January 1, 1978, whichever
is later. 15 6 The alternative measure, beginning January 1, 1978,
is applicable only to those works whose renewal term of copy-
right was previously extended either by the several interim ex-
tensions previously enacted' 57 or by the provisions of section
periodical publication. Consider the rationale for the alternative measure, discussed
below, and the fact that book publishers were among those responsible for it.
155 17 U.S.C.A. § 203(a)(3) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
1561d. § 304(c)(3).
157 Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, § 104, 88 Stat. 1873; Act of Oct. 25,
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-566, 86 Stat. 1181; Act of Nov. 24, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-170, 85
Stat. 490; Act of Dec. 17, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-555, 84 Stat. 1441; Act of Dec. 16, 1969,
Pub. L. No. 91-147, 83 Stat. 360; Act of July 23, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-416, 82 Stat.
397; Act of Nov. 16, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-141, 81 Stat. 464; Act of Aug. 28, 1965, Pub.
L. No. 89-142, 79 Stat. 581; Act of Sept. 19, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-668, 76 Stat. 555; see
2 TREATISE, supra note 6, at § 112.2 app.
TERMINATION OF TRANSFERS
304(b). 151 In all other instances, fifty-six years from the date
copyright was originally secured will in fact occur after January
1, 1978.
In addition to the general rationale suggested above for
termination of transfers, a further reason for termination exists
in the case of grants executed prior to January 1, 1978. Termi-
nation of such grants permits the author (or granting member of
a successor renewal class' 59) to recapture ownership in the work
during the nineteen-year additional period 160 that was added to
the renewal term by the 1976 general revision of the Copyright
Act. 61 Congress was of the view that "the extended term repre-
sents a completely new property right, and there are strong
reasons for giving the author, who is the fundamental bene-
ficiary of copyright under the Constitution, an opportunity to
share in it."
u6
2
V. How Is TERMINATION EFFECTED?
A. When Must the Termination Notice Be Served?
Before a grant may be terminated, a termination notice
must be properly served 63 upon the grantee or upon the
grantee's successor in title.' 64 Absent such service, no termina-
tion occurs. The termination notice must state the date of termi-
nation, which must fall within the five-year period during which
termination may occur. 165 The termination notice must be
served not less than two nor more than ten years before the'date
of termination specified in the notice.'
66
Therefore, in the case of a grant executed on or after
January 1, 1978 that does not "cover"'1 7 the right of publication,
158 The interim extensions referred to above cumulatively extended to December
31, 1976 the renewal term of copyright of those works whose renewal term would
otherwise have expired on or after September 19, 1962. Section 304(b) in effect added
an additional extension of renewal term for such works through December 31, 1977.
159 On proper renewal claimants, see text accompanying notes 43-59 supra (Section
IA(4)(a)).
160 With respect to works previously, or by section 304(b), the subject of renewal
extension, less than 19 years remain for recapture prior to the expiration of the newly
created 47-year renewal term.
161 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 304(b) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
162 H. REP., supra note 8, at 140.
163 Text accompanying notes 183-95 infra (Section VB).
164 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(a)(4), 304(c)(4) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
165 Text accompanying notes 149-62 supra (Section IV).
166 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(a)(4)(A), 304(c)(4)(A) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
167 On the ambiguity of "cover," see text accompanying notes 149-55 supra (Section
IVA).
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the earliest date a termination notice may be served is twenty-
five years after execution of the grant, and the latest date such
termination notice may be served is thirty-eight years after ex-
ecution of the grant.168 In the case of a grant executed on or
after January 1, 1978 that does "cover" the right of publication,
the earliest and latest dates for service of a termination notice
will depend upon whether the date of publication pursuant to
such grant 169 occurs less than or more than five years after exe-
cution of the grant. If publication occurs less than five years after
execution of the grant, the earliest date a termination notice
may be served is twenty-five years after such publication, and the
latest date a termination notice may be served is thirty-eight
years after such publication. If publication occurs more than five
years after execution of the grant, the earliest date a termination
notice may be served is thirty years after execution of the grant,
and the latest date a termination notice may be served is forty-
three years after execution of the grant.
In the case of a grant executed prior to January 1, 1978,1
7 11
the earliest date a termination notice may be served is forty-six
years after copyright was originally secured (which is to say,
eighteen years after the commencement of the renewal copy-
right term). The latest date such a termination notice may be
served is fifty-nine years after copyright was originally se-
cured (or thirty-one years after commencement of the renewal
copyright term).
A special problem is presented with respect to those works
whose renewal term of twenty-eight years under the old Act
would have expired prior to January 1, 1978 but for the interim
extensions enacted prior to the new Act' 7' and the additional
extension provided by section 304(b). Without these extensions,
such works would not have had the benefit of the additional
68 The five-year period during which termination may occur in the case of such a
grant expires 40 years after execution, and the latest date upon which a termination
notice may be served in order to effectuate termination 40 years after execution is two
years prior thereto, i.e., 38 years after execution.
169 Note that the relevant publication date is not necessarily the first date of publi-
cation of the work, but rather the first date of publication "under the grant." 17
U.S.C.A. § 203(a)(3) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976). Thus, a prior publication not made
pursuant to the grant would not trigger the termination period.
170 Note that with respect to grants executed prior to January 1, 1978 no distinction
is made between those grants that do and those that do not "cover" the right of publica-
tion. Compare 17 U.S.C.A. § 304(c)(3) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976), with id. § 203(c)(3).
171 See notes 157-58 supra & accompanying text.
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nineteen years added to the renewal term under the present Act.
Regarding such works, the five-year period during which termi-
nation may be effected begins January 1, 1978 because this
statutorily designated date is later than fifty-six years from the
date copyright was originally secured. 2 The latest date upon
which a termination notice may be served with respect to any
such work is January 1, 1981, two years before the expiration of
such five-year period. 7 3 The earliest date for service, however,
can hardly be ten years before the beginning of such five-year
term, notwithstanding the provision for ten-year advance notice
under section 304(c)(4)(A). Such a ten-year advance would begin
on January 1, 1968. Yet even if by some foresight the parties had
been aware of the ability to serve notice at that time, no notice
could be legally effective until after the effective date of the
current Act. But what is the effective date for these purposes?
Generally, the effective date of the new Act is January 1,
1978.174 This would mean that for such a work the earliest date
on which a termination notice might be served is January 1,
1978."7 It would further mean that only three years would re-
main after such date during which a termination notice might be
served.
The Copyright Office, however, suggests that for these pur-
poses the effective date of the new Act may be October 19, 1976,
the date the President signed the Act.' 76 If this is correct, a
termination notice may be served anytime after this date, and
termination itself might become effective, therefore, as early as
two years later, or October 19, 1978. What is the basis for the
Copyright Office's suggestion that the effective date of the new
Act for the purpose of service of termination notices may be
October 19, 1976 rather than the generally effective date of
January 1, 1978? The Act stipulates: "This Act becomes effective
on January 1, 1978, except as otherwise expressly provided by
172 17 U.S.C.A. § 304(c)(3) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
173 Id. § 304(c)(4)(A).
174 Id. note prec. § 101 (transitional and supplementary provisions).
175 Note that the House Report states that such works "become subject to termination
immediately upon the coming into effect of the revised law." H. REP., supra note 8, at
140. This cannot mean that termination may be effected immediately, because that
would conflict with 17 U.S.C.A. § 304(c)(4)(A) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976), which
requires service of a notice not less than two years before the specified termination
date. The above quoted statement apparently was intended to mean that a termination
notice may be served "immediately" with respect to such works.
176 See 41 Fed. Reg. 50,300 (1976) (proposed regulations on term of transfer).
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this Act . . . . 77 The only express exception provides that the
"provisions of sections 118, 304(b), and chapter 8 of title 17 ...
take effect upon enactment of this Act."' 78 But none of these
provisions has any bearing upon the service of a termination
notice.
The Copyright Office's suggestion is predicated upon the
theory that it is, indeed, "otherwise expressly provided" that the
provision controlling the time a termination notice may be
served is to be effective upon enactment of the Act, and not
merely on January 1, 1978. Although the five-year period dur-
ing which termination may occur is said to begin "on January 1,
1978,' ' 1 7 9 and although a termination "notice shall be served not
less than two or more than ten years before that date,' '18" the Act
may not become effective for service of termination notice pur-
poses "not less than two or more than ten years before"'' the
five-year period that begins January 1, 1978, because this would
lead to the absurd conclusion that the Act became effective even
before it was enacted on October 19, 1976. The result would be
avoided under the Copyright Office's suggestion, because the
service provisions would become effective upon enactment. It is
difficult to see, however, in what manner this particular date
may be said to be "provided" for by the terms of the Act.
The earliest and latest dates for service of the termination
notice in relation to the applicable five-year period for termina-
tion are the same regardless of the execution date of the grant.
In each case, the earliest date is ten years before the commence-
ment of the applicable five-year period, and the latest date is two
years before the expiration of the five-year period. 182 Further-
more, the time when any given termination notice must be
served is flexible. Having selected a given termination date
within the five-year period, and having specified that date within
the termination notice, notice may be served as early as ten years
before such date, and as late as two years before such date. The
ten-year maximum and two-year minimum advance notice re-
quirements are applicable to the actual date selected for termina-
17 17 U.S.C.A. note prec. § 101 (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976) (transitional and
supplementary provisions).
178 Id.
179 Id. § 304(c)(3).
180 Id. § 304(c)(4)(A).
181 Id.
182 Id. §§ 203(a)(4)(A), 304(c)(4)(A).
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tion, not to the applicable five-year period as such. Suppose, for
example, that termination may occur during the period of
January 1, 2022 through January 1, 2027. If the actual date for
termination as specified in the notice is January 1, 2026, such
notice must be served not later than January 1, 2024, two years
before the specified termination date. A termination notice
served thereafter but prior to January 1, 2025 would be ineffec-
tive even though it is served more than two years before the
expiration of the five-year period. Thus, it is important to select
a termination date within the applicable five-year period that will
permit compliance with the ten-year maximum and two-year
minimum notice requirements.
B. Termination Notice Formalities
The termination notice must be in writing,8 3 and the
number and proportion of the owners of the termination in-
terest184 who acting together have the right to terminate 8 5 must
sign the notice.' 86 A "duly authorized" agent may sign in the
place of any such owner.' 87 The Copyright Act does not ex-
pressly require that agency authorization be in writing, 8  but
caution suggests that authors, their successors, and their agents
put this authorization in writing. The effective date of ter-
mination 89 must be stated in the notice 911 The notice must be
served upon the grantee or the grantee's successor in title.' 9 If
the grantee has transferred some but not all of the rights that he
or she acquired under the grant, whether the original
grantee, his or her successor with respect to some of the rights,
or both, must be served will turn on which rights are purpor-
tedly terminated under the termination notice. If all rights are
183 Id. §§ 203(a)(4), 304(c)(4).
184 Text accompanying notes 101-10 supra (Section IIA(2)(a)).
"-' Text accompanying notes 86-139 supra (Section II).
17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(a)(4), 304(c)(4) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
I87 1d. The term "duly authorized agent" "include[s] the legally appointed guar-
dians or committees of persons incompetent to sign because of age or mental disability."
H. RPp., supra note 8, at 126. Presumably, such legal appointment must be made under
applicable state law. See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956).
188 This question would probably be determined by the state law of agency and
contracts, including the applicable statute of frauds. See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S.
570, 580 (1956). But cf. 2 TREATISE, supra note 6, § 115.11, at 474.3 (decrying lack of
uniformity in state law determination).
189 Text accompanying notes 149-62 supra (Section IV).
19- 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(a)(4)(A), 304(c)(4)(A) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
191 Id. §§ 203(a)(4), 304(c)(4).
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being terminated, all of the persons who own any portion of
such rights must be served in order to effectuate the termina-
tion.
The termination notice must be recorded in the Copyright
Office prior to the effective date of termination "as a condition
to its taking effect. ' 192 Thus, at some point simultaneously with
or subsequent to the service of the termination notice, but prior
to the termination date specified in the notice, a copy of the
notice must be recorded in the Copyright Office. The rights of
the class of persons entitled to claim as recipients of the termi-
nated rights, 193 however, will have vested as of the time notice is
served upon the grantee, 194 so that any change in the composi-
tion of such class occurring before a proper recordation in the
Copyright Office will have no effect upon such vested rights.
Recordation, then, is not a condition precedent to vesting, but a
failure to record prior to the effective date of termination consti-
tutes a failure to satisfy a condition subsequent, and results in
divestiture.
The termination notice must further comply in form, content,
and manner of service with the requirements of the Copyright
Office Regulations.'9 5
VI. THE VALIDITY OF AGREEMENTS IMPAIRING THE FREEDOM
TO TERMINATE OR TO MAKE FUTURE GRANTS
The effectiveness of the renewal structure under the 1909
Act (and under the new Act with respect to previously copy-
righted works) was largely undermined by the holding of Fred
Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons196 that renewal rights
may be assigned prior to their vesting.' 97 In order to avoid a
similar emasculation of the termination provisions, the new Act
provides that "[t]ermination of the grant may be effected not-
withstanding any agreement to the contrary, including an ag-
reement to make a will or to make any future grant."' 98 Thus,
one who proposes to purchase rights in a newly created work
192 Id. §§ 203(a)(4)(A), 304(c)(4)(A).
193 Text accompanying notes 140-48 supra (Section III).
194 Text accompanying notes 123-27 supra (Section IIA(3)).
195 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(a)(4)(B), 304(c)(4)(B) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976). Pro-
posed regulations may be found in 41 Fed. Reg. 50,300 (1976).
196 318 U.S. 643 (1943).
197 This point is discussed at some length in 2 TREATISE, supra note 6, at § 117.21.
198 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(a)(5), 304(c)(5) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
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may not exert greater bargaining power so as to require the
author to agree to surrender his or her future right of termina-
tion as a condition of sale. Moreover, a further grant of a termi-
nated right, as well as an agreement to make a further grant, is
valid only if it is made after the effective date of termination. 199
These limitations upon the right of a grantee to negate an
author's termination rights, as well as those upon the ability of
third parties to buy up "contingent future interests as a form of
speculation,"2 ° ° undoubtedly will be subject to all of the chal-
lenges that the ingenuity of the bar representing so-called user
groups can muster. An original grantee may be able periodically
to extend the time before which termination may occur if the
grantee can persuade the original grantor to terminate the orig-
inal grant by contract, and negotiate a new one, "thereby causing
another 35-year period to start running.'' 2°1 Such a voluntary
termination could occur at any time. This device is not satisfac-
tory from the user's standpoint, because if the original termina-
tion period is imminent, the original grantor will require a sub-
stantial consideration to agree to terminate the first grant and
thereby to postpone his or her reversion of rights. °2 If the orig-
inal termination period is not imminent, the original grantor
might be persuaded to agree to such a postponement for a
minor consideration, but the benefit to the original grantee
could be commensurately minor because the period of post-
ponement would be relatively slight. Quite apart from these
practical considerations, there is a serious legal question whether
the execution of a new grant will effectively postpone the period
for termination if the voluntary termination of the prior grant is
conditioned by the grantee upon the grantor's consent to exe-
cute the new grant. The courts may analogize this problem to
the "preexisting duty" rule under the law of contracts. Suppose,
for example, that in a given contract A's only duty to B is to pay
199 Id. §§ 203(b)(4), 304(c)(6)(D). An agreement to make such a further grant, how-
ever, may be made after notice of termination has been served but before the effective
date of termination if the grantee of such further grant is the original grantee of the
terminated rights, or his or her successor in interest, and if the grantors are those
qualified to make the further grant. Id.
200 H. REP., supra note 8, at 127.
20 1 Id.
202 This may not be true, however, if the persons empowered to terminate volun-
tarily the original grant are not the same as the persons who will be the recipients of
the terminated rights. This might occur if the original grantor-author does not survive
to the termination period, and the beneficiaries of the author's estate are persons other
than his or her surviving spouse and children.
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him the sum of $5,000. B's duty in return is to perform certain
described services for a period of six months. Thereafter A and
B enter into a new contract that purports to rescind the prior
agreement, and to provide that A's duty will remain the same
-the payment of $5,000-but B's duty will be altered in that the
same services will be required of him for one year rather than
six months. The preexisting-duty rule invalidates the second
agreement. 203 In return for B's new promise to render addi-
tional services he obtained no additional consideration from A,
who remained obligated only to perform that which was already
her preexisting duty. This preexisting duty was not extinguished
by the provision in the new agreement purporting to rescind the
old agreement because that provision was itself conditioned
upon the execution of the new agreement. As Corbin observes,
upholding the second agreement would be "arguing in a circle,
making the validity of the new agreement depend upon the re-
scission while the validity of the rescission depended upon the
new agreement. 2114 Therefore, B is not bound, and under the
rule of mutuality neither is A. Circularity is avoided only if there
is a moment when A is bound under neither the old nor the new
agreement.
To conclude that the validity of a new copyright grant is
conditioned upon the termination of the prior grant, while the
termination of the prior grant is conditioned upon the validity of
the new grant is similarly circular. Here, however, new consider-
ation arguably is tendered on both sides. The grantee is paying
for the grantor's voluntary cancellation and new grant, and the
grantor is giving new consideration by postponing the period
when he or she would be entitled to terminate. But the issue
here is not the consideration requirement, but the prohibition of
a new grant unless the prior grant is terminated. By analogy to,
rather than by strict application of, the preexisting-duty rule, the
courts may conclude that a grantee may not subvert the statutory
rule against obtaining a new grant prior to termination of the
original grant (or at least prior to the time when a notice of
termination under the original grant may be served 2115) unless
there is at least a moment when the grantor is bound under
2
""See IA A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 186 (1963).
2114 Id. 159.
215 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(b)(4), 304(c)(6)(D) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976). On when
the notice of termination may be served, see text accompanying notes 163-82 supra
(Section VA).
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neither the prior nor the new grant. During this moment, of
course, the grantor could refuse to execute the new agreement.
This would fulfill the statutory purpose of giving the grantor at
least one chance to revoke the grant. Without such a period
between the lapse of the prior grant and the commencement of
the new one, there is not a new grant, but only a change in the
terms of the old grant, which remains viable for the purpose of
measuring the time until the termination period.
Another device is open to grantees, however, that may in
some degree avoid the above difficulty. Suppose that the origi-
nal grant provides that if the grantor elects to invoke the stat-
utory right of termination the grantor will not thereafter grant
the terminated rights. Such a provision is not rendered invalid
by any of the terms of the new Act. Sections 203(a)(5) and
304(c)(5) merely inhibit limiting the right to terminate, which
the above provision arguably would not do. Sections 203(b)(4)
and 304(c)(6)(D) limit agreements to make further grants, but
do not explicitly prohibit or limit agreements not to make fur-
ther grants. Would such a limitation be of any practical value
to a grantee given that termination of the grantee's rights would
not be precluded? It would have some value in that in certain
instances it might dissuade a grantor from exercising his or
her termination rights. At the very least it would mean that the
grantee in purchasing a further grant (having waived the limi-
tation) would be required to pay a price lower than would be
the case if the grantor were free to seek other buyers.
It may be argued, however, that the termination provisions
of the new Act indirectly bar such agreements not to grant ter-
minated rights. If an agreement explicitly negated the right to
grant such terminated rights to anyone except the original grant-
ee, the agreement might be said to constitute a grant of exclu-
sive rights to the original grantee subject to the condition prece-
dent that the copyright owner thereafter elect to exploit the
work.2 16 This conditional agreement to grant exclusive rights
would be purportedly nonterminable and, to that extent, void.2' 7
Arguably, an agreement negating the grantor's right to grant
206 Such an agreement is analogous to an "output" contract, by which a single cus-
tomer agrees to purchase the entire output of a seller. Output contracts are valid even
though the seller is free to produce nothing, because the buyer is assured that the
supplier will not sell to the buyer's competitors. 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 100 (1963);
IA id. § 158.
207 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(a)(5), 304(c)(5) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
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further terminated rights to anyone, including the other party
(the original grantee), should be deemed not to negate such
right with respect to the original grantee because, as a matter of
contract law, as the beneficiary of this limitation the grantee re-
tains the right to waive it. Such agreements limiting the grantor's
right to grant terminated rights might also be held invalid for
reasons extraneous to the Copyright Act.
2 ' 8
VII. FURTHER GRANTS AND AGREEMENTS TO MAKE
FURTHER GRANTS OF TERMINATED RIGHTS
A. When May Such Agreements or Further Grants Be Made?
Neither a further grant nor an agreement to make a further
grant of any right subject to termination will be valid unless such
grant or agreement is executed after the date of termination of
the original grant of such right.2 9 As an exception, an agree-
ment to make such a further grant may be made after notice of
termination has been served,2 "' although the date of termination
has not yet arrived, if such agreement is between persons au-
thorized to make a further grant 211 and the original grantee of
the terminated grant or the grantee's successor in title.21 2 Even
as between such parties, this exception does not apply to the
making of further grants, but only to agreements to make
further grants. 21 3 Thus, the original grantee has some advantage
over others in obtaining the terminated rights. The House Report
refers to this advantage, not entirely accurately, as "a right of
'first refusal.' "214
Suppose that after the service of notice of termination the
author contractually agrees to convey to the original grantee the
terminated rights, but the author dies before the effective date
of termination. Who is entitled to the terminated rights-the
original grantee, the author's estate, or the author's surviving
spouse and children? Because the termination interest vested
21 Unless such a prohibition on further grants were limited to some reasonable
period, it might be held invalid as a restraint on alienation, a restraint of trade, or a
restraint of competition.
209 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(b)(4), 304(c)(6)(D) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976). For a dis-
cussion of the date of termination, see text accompanying notes 149-62 supra (Sec-
tion IV).
21 Text accompanying notes 163-82 supra (Section VA).
211 Text accompanying notes 216-20 infra (Section VIIB).
212 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(b)(4), 304(c)(6)(D) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
2 13 
Id.
214 H. REP., supra note 8, at 127.
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upon service of the termination notice,215 and because an agree-
ment to convey such terminated rights to the original grantee
may be made after service of the termination notice but before
the effective date of termination, the original grantee is entitled
to claim the benefit of the further grant of the terminated rights.
If necessary, the grantee should be able to demand specific per-
formance.
Assume the same facts described above, except that the au-
thor contractually agrees to convey the terminated rights to a
third party (rather than to the original grantee). The agreement
is invalid because it was made before the effective date of termi-
nation, and therefore the third party takes nothing. But as be-
tween the author's estate and the author's surviving spouse and
children, who prevails? Because the author died after the termi-
nation interest had vested in him or her, the author's estate
rather than the surviving spouse and children would be entitled
to the terminated rights.
B. Who May Make Further Grants or Agreements
to Make Further Grants of Terminated Rights?
A further grant, or an agreement to make a further grant,
of any right that has theretofore been terminated by operation
of the statutory termination provisions must be executed by the
same number and proportion of owners of the termination
interest as was necessary in order to effectuate the prior ter-
mination.216 Thus, if a majority of owners of the termination
interest was required in order to terminate the grant of a given
right, a majority is also required in order to make a new grant,
or an agreement to make a new grant, of the same right.217 The
215 Text accompanying notes 123-27 supra (Section HA(3)).
216 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(b)(3), 304(c)(6)(C) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
217 This introduces a theoretical anomaly. Five joint authors must be unanimous in
their execution of any exclusive grants of their copyright interest, because they are
perceived as cotenants of the copyright. See notes 89-91 supra & accompanying text.
Three of the five may terminate the grant, and, it seems, three of the five may execute
a new grant of the same rights.
On the other hand, the contenancy theory of ownership, note 89 supra, suggests
that any joint author may grant a nonexclusive license. But if three of the five grant
and then terminate a nonexclusive license, two of the three must join to regrant the
terminated rights, under a literal reading of 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(b)(3), 304(c)(6)(C)
(West Supp. IV part 1, 1976). Arguably, however, an author who grants nonexclusive
rights retains the right to make further nonexclusive grants, and therefore a regrant of
such rights by a single author after the termination of the grant by three coauthors is
the exercise by the single grantor of his or her retained (not reverted) right. But sup-
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precise individuals who joined in the termination, however, need
not also join in the further grant or agreement to grant.218 Thus,
some of those who joined in the termination may decline to join
in a further grant, and others who did not join in the termina-
tion may be party to the further grant.
The class of those who are qualified to join in a further
grant or agreement to make a further grant consists of the same
individuals who were qualified to terminate the original grant
and is determined as of the time the termination interest
vested.219 If after such vesting a given member of the class dies,
that member's "legal representatives, legatees, or heirs at law 2213
under applicable state probate laws would stand in the member's
shoes for purposes of further grants and agreements to grant.
Thus, if a deceased author's widow or widower is living at the
time the termination vests but dies before a further grant is
made, those who claim through the widow's or widower's estate
would be entitled to exercise the termination interest for the
purpose of joining in a further grant.
C. Who Is Bound by Further Grants or Agreements to
Make Further Grants of Terminated Rights?
Any member of the class entitled to join in a further grant
or agreement to make a further grant is bound by such further
grant or agreement, regardless of whether such person in fact
joins in such grant or agreement. 22a This, of course, assumes
that a sufficient number and proportion of the owners of the
termination interest join in such a grant or agreement so as to
render it a valid instrument.
pose that the three granting coauthors had promised the grantee that they would not
make further nonexclusive grants (although the three coauthors cannot bind the two
who did not join in the grant). When such a grant is terminated, only a majority of the
original grantors can regrant any nonexclusive rights, because the right to grant such
rights was acquired through reversion.
Thus, it seems that a grant and termination limits the ability of individual joint
authors to veto exclusive grants of rights and individually to grant nonexclusive
licenses. Exceptions cannot easily be read into the statute to restore theoretical consis-
tency, because if one exception applies for exclusive grants, and another for nonexclu-
sive grants, almost all grants of interests in joint works are covered. Furthermore, the
application of this same statutory scheme to the statutory successors of a deceased sole
author (or of one joint author) suggests a legislative intent not to create a tenancy in
common in reverted rights in general.
218 H. REP., supra note 8, at 127.
19 Text accompanying notes 123-27 supra (Section IIA(3)).
22. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(b)(3), 304(c)(6)(C) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
221 Id.
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VIII. THE EFFECT OF FAILURE TO TERMINATE
If the persons entitled to terminate a grant 222 fail to serve a
proper termination notice within the required time,223 or other-
wise to comply with the required formalities, -2 2 4 no termination
will occur by operation of the provisions of the new Act.225 The
grant will continue in effect unless terminated by its own terms
or for other reasons.
226
IX. CONCLUSION
In the next few years the energies of copyright lawyers and
the courts will be devoted in large measure to understanding
and assimilating these intricate new termination provisions. If
this Article does not explore all of the problems, nor offer all of
the answers, it is hoped that it offers a useful base for the begin-
ning of such exploration.
222 Text accompanying notes 86-139 supra (Section II).
223 Text accompanying notes 163-82 supra (Section VA).
224 Text accompanying notes 183-95 supra (Section VB).
225 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203(b)(6), 304(c)(6)(F) (West Supp. IV part 1, 1976).
226 For a discussion of the circumstances justifying the grantor's revocation of a
grant of renewal rights, see 2 TREATISE, supra note 6, at § 130.
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